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THE RISE OF THE DRONES: FRAMEWORK AND
GOVERNANCE—WHY RISK IT!
DR. SARAH JANE FOX*
ABSTRACT
Some seventy-one years ago, it was found that drones could
play a role within our society. While the military was quick to
realize this and develop the technology, it is only recently that
the civilian application is being explored en masse. That said,
given this prediction and the military direction, legislators find
themselves now unprepared for the civilian use and market po-
tential. However, this is not an unprecedented situation; the
civil aviation (manned) market has often shown an inability to
work together, be prepared, and cooperate. As a consequence,
there has been fragmentation and, arguably, casualties associ-
ated with such lethargy.
This article discusses the aspects of risk, governance, liability
(predominately covering safety and security), and the need for a
suitable framework relating to drone usage (particularly viewed
from the perspective of third parties). This article identifies the
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challenges, while the research focuses on the direction of the
European Union (EU) and the lessons learned from the unity
and development within the manned civil aviation framework. It
is argued that, going forward, there is a need not just to adapt
existing aviation systems and mechanisms, and to apply best
practices, but to learn from past failures and the successes of
other modes and systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN 1946, THE AMERICAN magazine Popular Science recog-nized that “[d]rones, as the radio-controlled craft are called,
have many potentialities, civilian and military.”1 It is therefore
not surprising that in the seventy-year period since, technologi-
cal advancements have realized the this statement, alongside the
full potential of the newer, advanced drones (which, in many
instances, bear little physical resemblance to their earlier minia-
ture-aircraft counterparts).
Warfare has long had a synergy with aviation.2 It “has been
instrumental in aiding and developing aviation technology” and
in advancing the development of the aircraft, so it is therefore
unsurprising to see drones also advancing through military in-
tervention.3 While the military and border authorities have long
been using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), unmanned com-
bat aerial vehicles (UCAV), and drone aircraft in their respec-
tive roles, the use of civilian unmanned aircraft is relatively
newer in comparison. That said, innovative usage of drones is
now widely being explored under the civilian remit.
However, what is perhaps surprising is that despite this predi-
cative statement within an eminent publication, and despite the
proven military and security worth of modern drones, only re-
cently has consideration been given to mechanisms that allow
opportunities while respecting the associated challenges. In this
regard, there are lessons to be learned regarding military usage,
where drones have struck at targets and have remained relatively
unaccountable, and in essence, untraceable. There are close
links to the missiles and other projectiles discharged, in terms of




2 Sarah Jane Fox, The Evolution of Aviation in Times of War and Peace: Blood,
Tears, and Salvation, 31 INT’L J. ON WORLD PEACE 49, 49–52 (2014).
3 Id.
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being a formidable weapon, which, in the wrong hands, could
easily be replicated against civil society. Therefore, there is a
fine line in determining what a drone actually is—in the right
hands and in a safe and secure setting, these machines remain
an aid to society, arguably a transport system for assistance and
support. And, in essence, this new “transport system” is set to
become part of our everyday lives. But, as so often has been the
case in civil aviation development, legislators, particularly from a
governance perspective, have been slow to keep pace and argua-
bly to recognize this growning risk of unmanned machines that
will increasingly be seen flying above us.
II. DEFINING DRONES: WHAT DO YOU MEAN!
The term “drone” is now synonymous with a machine that
flies above us, but the word itself has many applications and
meanings extending past this more recent man-made definition.
According todictionaries, “drone” refers to a low and continu-
ous humming sound,4 or repetitive action (sometimes lacking
meaning, but of a monotonous nature).5 It also refers to a sting-
less male bee that mates with the queen and does not gather
nectar or pollen.6 In this respect, the use of the word drone for
an apparatus that takes to the air and that, certainly in the past,
had a continuous buzz, seems remarkably apt.7 And it is only
now that the opportunities to use a drone for applications that
benefit society are beginning to be fully explored. Global expen-
diture on the acquisition of drones is expected to double to $91
billion in the ten-year period between 2014 and 2024, making
the drone sector the most dynamic growth sector of the global
aviation industry.8
The EU anticipates that in the next twenty years, its drone
industry will directly employ over 100,000 people and will im-
4 Drone, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
drone (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) [https://perma.cc/TXG2-J2MC].
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 It is reported that the name drone stems from the DeHavilland Queen Bee
developed in the United Kingdom and produced between 1934–1943. Brian
Benchoff, A Brief History of ‘Drone’, AMA FLIGHT SCHOOL: THE EVOLUTION OF
DRONES (Sept. 26, 2016), www.amaflightschool.org/DRONEHISTORY [https://
perma.cc/3BK2-KJTT].
8 Press Release, Teal Grp. Corp., Teal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market
Will Total $91 Billion in Its 2014 UAV Market Profile and Forecast (July 17,
2014), www.tealgroup.com/index.php/about-teal-group-corporation/press-re
leases/118-2014-uav-press-release [https://perma.cc/33M9-U3FC].
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pact the economy in excess of 10 billion euros per year—which
will mostly be associated with the service sector.9 However, while
the potential to use drones is becoming realized, the wider inter-
national community is far from coordinated in its approach to
regulate such usage. They even seem unsettled in defining a
drone in the first instance, let alone where drones fit in existing
legislation and governance systems. John Villasenor provided a
simplistic definition that “a drone is an unmanned aircraft that
can fly autonomously.”10 This alone is a statement of conten-
tion—taking the first part in isolation, what exactly is an un-
manned aircraft? In reality, there exists an incredible range of
shapes, sizes, and capabilities that characterize a drone.11 The
EU states that there are over 1,700 different types of drones pro-
duced by official manufacturers (with approximately one-third
made in the EU).12 Further, this number fails to account for the
drones made by individual persons and by unregistered or un-
recognized sources.
In defining “autonomously,” Villasenor added that he meant,
“without a human in control.”13 Yet, in his attempt to specify,
this is now a far too simplistic definition.14 And while further
clarity can be given to size, weight, and shape—in other words,
specifications—it is the human aspect of “control” that will
largely be the disputed element going forward. Some potential
issues (particularly in litigation) concern the degree of control
and location of the person who ultimately needs to assume re-
9 Unmanned Aircrafts, EUR. COMM’N, ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/aeronautics
/rpas_en (last updated Oct. 23, 2017) [https://perma.cc/QR7Z-52MF].
10 John Villasenor, What Is a Drone, Anyway?, SCI. AM. (Apr. 12, 2012), https://
blogs.scientificamerican.com/guest-blog/what-is-a-drone-anyway/ [https://per
ma.cc/6GAC-T44X]. John Villasenor is a non-resident senior fellow at the Brook-
ings Institution and a professor of electrical engineering at UCLA. His quote is
taken from the Scientific American online platform.
11 While drones come in a variety of formats, there are two broad categories:
(1) fixed wing and (2) rotary wing. Most light drones are of the rotary-wing type,
with four, six, or eight sets of rotors. A common format is the quadcopter, a
helicopter that is lifted and propelled by four rotors. The quadcopter can be
used to carry a camera, which may have a wireless data link to the ground. This
would allow real-time surveillance to be carried out at minimum cost. Andrew
Chapman, Types of Drones: Multi-Rotor vs Fixed-Wing vs Single Rotor vs Hybrid VTOL,
AUSTRALIAN UAV (June 2016), https://www.auav.com/au/articles/drone-types/
[https://perma.cc/Z7SY-ECCM].
12 European Commission Memo 14/259, Remotely Piloted Aviation Systems
(RPAS) - Frequently Asked Questions (Apr. 8, 2014) [hereinafter Eur. Comm’n
Memo 14/259].
13 Villasenor, supra note 11.
14 Id.
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sponsibility for the drone’s action, purpose, and, inevitably, con-
sequences. As it currently stands, categorizing drones and
determining responsibility are engulfed in a myriad of different
opinions and perspectives—starting with what to call the “ma-
chine” in the first place! The list below provides commonly used
words and abbreviations found in this article15:
• Drone—much-favored by the French; for example, see the
French Directorate for Civil Aviation (DGAC);
• RPA/S (Remotely Piloted Aircraft or Remotely Piloted Air-
craft System)—used mostly by International and National
Aviation Agencies;
• UAS (Unmanned Aerial System)—still largely used by the
United States and United Kingdom;
• UA (unmanned aircraft)—cited within EU (proposed)
legislation; and
• UAV—mostly used as a generic reference (alongside
drone) by the general population.
A. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE
The Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago
Convention) is applicable to the operations of civil aircraft,16
but it is likely that the talks leading to it implementation did not
envisage its application to today’s drones. In fact, none of the
above abbreviations or words can be found within the Chicago
Convention.
Article 8 of the Chicago Convention titled “Pilotless aircraft”
states: “No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall
be flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State
without special authorization by that State and in accordance
with the terms of such authorization.”17 In this regard, the state-
ment is applicable to the over-flight of such a pilotless aircraft
outside its own territory and within the territory of one of the
other contracting States.
Article 8 goes on to identify that “[e]ach contracting State un-
dertakes to insure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot
in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so controlled as to obvi-
15 When referring to websites and citing documents, this article usually uses
the definition contained in the source.
16 Convention on International Civil Aviation art. 3 para. (a), Dec. 7, 1944, 61
Stat. 1180, 15 U.N.T.S. 295 [hereinafter Chicago Convention].
17 Id. art. 8.
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ate danger to civil aircraft.”18 Therefore, the responsibilities for
ensuring safe operations for all civilian aircraft from the dangers
of such unmanned aircraft lie clearly upon each contracting
State. This means, per Article 1, the Sovereignty element lies
exclusively with each contracting State to ensure that any civil
aircraft remains safe from the dangers that such unmanned
craft could cause.19 The reference to “insure”20 is therefore one
of assurance rather than indemnity or remuneration; neverthe-
less, if applied literally, this would add a completely different
perspective to the picture of governance, and may serve as a dif-
ferent avenue to be explored regarding today’s drones—how-
ever they are to be defined. This said, there remains some
disagreement as to what “pilotless aircraft” actually covers, with
its interpretation now extending to the realms of Remotely
Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS)21 within this definition.22 The
Global Air Transport Management Operational Concept (Doc
9854) states, “[a]n unmanned aerial vehicle is a pilotless air-
craft, in the sense of Article 8 of the Convention on Interna-
tional Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which is flown
without a pilot-in-command on-board and is either remotely and
fully controlled from another place (ground, another aircraft,
space) or programmed and fully autonomous.”23
So conversely, perhaps this attempt to define “drone” is best
approached by defining “aircraft” first—regardless of the posi-
tion of the pilot. According to U.S. federal law, for instance, an
aircraft is defined as “any contrivance invented, used, or de-
18 Id. (emphasis added).
19 Id. art. 1.
20 Id. art. 8.
21 Even in this regard, there lies some dispute as to whether Unmanned Air-
craft Systems (UASs) are one in the same. Within COM(2014) 207, it is stated
that “RPAS form part of the wider category of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS).”
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, A New Era for Aviation: Opening the Aviation Market to the Civil Use of Re-
motely Piloted Aircraft Systems in a Safe and Sustainable Manner, at 2, COM(2014) 207
final (Apr. 8, 2014) [hereinafter A New Era for Aviation]. It is further stated that
UASs also include “aircraft that can be programmed to fly autonomously without
the involvement of a pilot.” Id.
22 Eur. Comm’n Memo 14/259, supra note 13, at 1; see also Int’l Civil Aviation
Org., Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), at 11, Cir 328-AN/190 (2011) [herein-
after ICAO Unmanned Aircraft].
23 Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Global Air Traffic Management Operational Con-
cept, at Appendix B-6, Doc 9854-AN/458 (2005) [hereinafter ICAO Global Air
Traffic]. This understanding of UAVs was later endorsed by the 35th Session of
the ICAO Assembly.
2017] THE RISE OF THE DRONES 689
signed to navigate, or fly in, the air.”24 The Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA) defines “aircraft” very simply, as a “device
that is used or intended to be used for flight in the air.”25 Profes-
sor Marshall, referring to the Chicago Convention, states that
“[i]t is thus clear that the ICAO definitions of aircraft that are
subject to its Articles, Annexes, and Supplementary Agreements
include any man-made contrivance that is capable of sustained
flight above the immediate surface level of the Earth.”26 There-
fore an aircraft is “[a]ny machine that can derive support in the
atmosphere from the reactions of the air.”27 Arguably, this defi-
nition also encompasses drones.
According to the EU, “The rules covering drones are cur-
rently set at UN level, by the International Civil Aviation Organi-
sation (ICAO),”28 adding that, in general, this extends to
forbidding “unmanned aircraft to fly unless the national compe-
tent authorities issue a specific individual authorization.”29 As
this paragraph alone shows, there remains a degree of contra-
diction, which has subsequently been translated into a failure to
assume and ensure proper governance. In this period of ten
years, while there have been some discussions concerning the
need to have a framework in place to recognize the anticipated
rise of drone numbers, developments have been noticeably slow.
It was on April 12, 2005, at the commencement of its 169th
Session, when the Air Navigation Commission asked the Secre-
tary General to begin consulting selected States and other inter-
national organizations regarding “present and foreseen
international civil unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) activities in
civil airspace.”30 In a follow-up meeting held in Montreal (May
23–24, 2006),31 it was decided that the ICAO was not the most
appropriate organization to spearhead the development of tech-
nical and performance specifications for UAVs; nevertheless it
was recognized that the ICAO did have a role to play by acting as
24 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6) (2012).
25 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (2016).
26 Douglas M. Marshall, International Regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Operations
in Offshore and International Airspace, 8 ISSUES AVIATION L. & POL’Y 87, 93 (2008).
27 IACO Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 23, at ix. On November 6, 1967, the
International Civil Aviation Organization issued a new definition: Aircraft is
“[a]ny machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of
the air other than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.” Id.
28 Eur. Comm’n Memo 14/259, supra note 13, at 2.
29 COM(2014) 207 final, supra note 22 at 4.
30 ICAO Unmanned Aircraft, supra note 23 at 1.
31 Id. (deemed the first informal ICAO meeting on UAVs).
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a “focal point.”32 Also stressed was a need for a coordinated reg-
ulatory framework based upon global interoperability.33 How-
ever, the ICAO identified further limitations of governance,
particularly regarding “model aircraft,” which are intended for
recreation and fall outside the provisions of the Chicago Con-
vention.34 The difficulty here undoubtedly remains the fine line
between the hobbyist’s recreational drones and how they fit
within a framework, particularly given the exclusion that already
has existed for the model aircraft and the potential risk that still
exists in terms of their operations. For instance, will limitations
be placed on non-commercial purchases of drones? Will catego-
rization be related to the drone’s size, purpose, or usage? Will
“remotely operated” actually be defined (in terms of defining
where the operator should be located—relative to the device
and in what circumstances)? And ultimately, how will a frame-
work and governance system be applied? In essence, there are
many questions still to be answered, and even to be raised, as to
how a framework will work and be applied.
With the growing numbers of drones (since 2005), the per-
ceived and possible risks have also increased, not only to civil
aviation operations but also to the greater society. The stance
initially taken by the ICAO may have changed somewhat; it is
now stepping forward to expand its portfolio to include un-
manned aircraft or RPAS, officially formalizing its efforts in No-
vember 2014 with the creation of the RPAS Panel. 35 While there
has been more direction from the ICAO than was first intention-
ally or unintentionally implied—such as its recent Manual on Re-
motely Piloted Aircraft Systems36—the ICAO has nevertheless
struggled to keep pace with the technological advancements
and demands of this extending sector of the aviation industry.
In fact, producing the guidance before the standards and rec-
ommended practices (SARPs) was unprecedented. But impor-
tantly, it was necessary because the industry was developing so




35 Int’l Civil Aviation Org., Manual on Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems
(RPAS), at 1-3, Doc 10019-AN/507 (2015) [hereinafter ICAO Remote Pilot
Manual].
36 Id. (produced by the former ICAO UAS Study Group (now replaced by the
ICAO RPAS Panel)).
37 Dee Ann Divis, ICAO Tackles International Standards for Unmanned Aircraft, IN-
SIDE UNMANNED SYS., http://insideunmannedsystems.com/icao-tackles-interna
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gation Bureau, which leads the RPAS, reinforced this when he
expressed the need for a new way of addressing development
and cooperation, including the lessons learned from civil avia-
tion.38 Creamer explained that “relatively simple standards” had
taken the ICAO “25 years to develop and implement across the
globe,” adding that “we don’t have that kind of time with RPAS
because the technology simply has outpaced us.”39 In just over
the ten-year period since the “present and foreseen” situations
and potential were first broached and discussed at an interna-
tional level, Member States have continued to apply differing
requirements and obligations on operators. This fact is empha-
sized by the UAS Toolkit (hosted by the ICAO), which only too
clearly highlights the differences concerning requirements relat-
ing to UASs on a country-by-country basis.40 This includes within
the EU, where the twenty-eight Member States have, for the
most part, responded from a unilateral perspective.
III. CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES—A NEW,
“RISKY” ERA FOR AVIATION
The 2014 EU publication discussed earlier addresses the po-
tential for civil use of RPAS, clearly recognizing the worth of this
adapting and evolving transport mode in terms of new jobs and
growth.41 It is clear that technological expertise in the civil
drones (or RPAS) sector is crucial to Europe’s ability to compete
in the aeronautics field42—which, according to some estimates,
could compose ten percent of the aviation market in the next
ten years.43
On the whole, it is largely recognized that transport modes
will become more automated, which includes the evolution of
the civil aviation sector. Drones certainly have various roles to
play—for example, in inspections of critical infrastructure, such
as rail tracks or power grids, or in emergency relief and other
disaster situations, such as fighting forest fires, surveying devel-
tional-standards-for-unmanned-aircraft/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) [https://per
ma.cc/3LL5-TYC9].
38 Id.
39 Id.; see Integrating RPAS into Airspace, 70 ICAO J. 4, 4 (2015).
40 ICAO Launches Unmanned Aircraft Systems Toolkit, ICAO: NEWS RELEASES (Dec.
13, 2016), http://www.icao.int/Newsroom/Pages/icao-launches-unmanned-air
craft-systems-toolkit.aspx [https://perma.cc/6T4P-KSZ3].
41 A New Era for Aviation, supra note 22, at 2–3.
42 Id.
43 Eur. Comm’n Memo 14/259, supra note 13, at 2.
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oping situations, and providing necessary aid.44 There is no
doubt that drones are capable of saving lives. Indeed, the worth
of such drones is already being recognized.45 For example,
drones can prevent crimes (such as poaching in Kenya), 46 pro-
tect crops47 and borders,48 and provide humanitarian aid.49 Op-
portunities are immense and  not even fully known, realized,
and even explored with respect to societal needs and require-
ments. However, there remain concerns of public acceptance of
what is seen as a futuristic device (though it exists today) in rela-
tion to safety, security, privacy, and the related aspect of liability
of unmanned aircraft within the EU (and elsewhere). After all,
the drone is often portrayed in science fiction films as a
predator and aggressor—a factor that has no doubt been ampli-
fied by the frequently publicized military use of such technolo-
gies, remotely controlled and used in foreign zones to take lives
and destroy property.
Likewise, there is no doubt that challenges remain, and that
now is the time to review all aspects of new, emerging risks re-
lated to this nascent technology. Such action is essential in order
to develop an appropriate governance system to protect, moni-
tor, and enforce suitable drone use where necessary. While con-
sideration is given to the commercial drone industry and
44 Testimony – Statement of Michael G. Whitaker, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Oct.
7, 2015) [hereinafter Whitaker Testimony], https://www.faa.gov/news/testimo
ny/news_story.cfm?newsid=19558 [https://perma.cc/9P3X-K38E].
45 See id.
46 Gitonga Njeru, Kenya to Deploy Drones in All National Parks in Bid to Tackle
Poaching, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 25, 2014, 6:49 AM), https://www.theguardian.
com/environment/2014/apr/25/kenya-drones-national-parks-poaching [https:/
/perma.cc/C2P9-AXKJ].
47 In Japan, drones are used to spray approximately forty percent of the rice
crop, with over 2,400 drones estimated to now in service. Commercial UAV Applica-
tions in Asia: Industry Report, TERRAPINN 9 (Aug. 8, 2017) https://www.terra
pinn.com/template/Live/documents/7036/15870#sthash.KjR5wlJF.dpbs; see also
Kenzo Nonami, Prospect and Recent Research & Development for Civil Use Autonomous
Unmanned Aircraft as UAV and MAV, 1 J. SYS. DESIGN & DYNAMICS 120, 120–28
(2007).
48 For example, use of drones to patrol the U.S. borders with Mexico and Ca-
nada has significantly contributed to border security. Bob Orr, Predator Drones
Shift from Battlefield to Border, CBS NEWS (Nov. 9, 2010, 6:04 PM), https://www.cbs
news.com/news/predator-drones-shift-from-battlefield-to-border/ [https://
perma.cc/8XSM-MZU3].
49 See Denise Soesilo, How Drones Can Help in Humanitarian Crises, EUR.
COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/field-blogs/stories/how-drones-can-help-hu
manitarian-crises_en (last updated Nov. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/YN9J-C46
H] (discussing the EU’s use of drones for humanitarian aid).
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creating a suitable framework in place to cover that new sector
of growth, “the demand for recreational drones has exceeded
anyone’s expectations.”50
One key aspect going forward will be preventing the means
for abuse of all systems and having the mechanisms to take ac-
tion—whether this is accomplished through compensation, en-
forcement, or prohibition. In 2015, Lloyd’s of London51
published a report on the associated threats of drones in terms
of not having a strong regulatory framework in place. It identi-
fied the need, from an insurance perspective, to have coordi-
nated international standards and clarity on third-party liability,
alongside other insurance needs relating to use.52 In the coming
years, there is little doubt that we will see a new area of litigation
relating to a whole spectrum of claims and areas involving civil
drones—the impact of which, in terms of development and con-
tribution, has been compared to that of the Internet.53 However,
there are warnings to heed from this comparison regarding
abuse and the ability to effectively regulate a sector that itself
lacks a suitable governance framework. There are also lessons to
be learned in terms of being prepared from both safety and se-
curity perspectives. There can be little disputing the potential
for disaster due to security breaches and failure to ensure a high
level of safety. History has clearly taught us lessons regarding
abuse of aircraft in the wrong hands.54 One essential factor in
developing an appropriate framework is to recognize not only
the threats, risks, and challenges that exist today, but also those
that will exist and intensify tomorrow.
A. ACCIDENTS, INCIDENTS (SAFETY, SECURITY) AND DRONES:
FRAMING THE FUTURE
There is ultimately a fine line between the definitions of safety
and security. Safety can be perceived as including the concept of
security from the stance of ensuring the absence of danger that
50 Whitaker Testimony, supra note 45.
51 Lloyd’s of London is recognized as the world’s only specialist insurance and
reinsurance market with extensive experience in the aviation market.
52 Drones Take Flight: Key Issues for Insurance, LLOYD’S 3 (2015), https://
www.lloyds.com/news-and-insight/risk-insight/library/technology/drones-take-
flight [https://perma.cc/PMH9-C4U8].
53 Eur. Comm’n Memo 14/259, supra note 13, at 2.
54 Sarah Jane Fox, “To Practise Justice and Right”—International Aviation Liability:
Have Lessons Been Learnt?, 5 INT’L J. PUB. LAW & POL’Y 162, 162–82 (2015) [here-
inafter Fox, International Aviation Liability].
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would compromise human life.55 Taking these words collec-
tively, passengers expect to be safe and secure when flying in
aircraft, although it is argued that they accept a level of volun-
tary risk;56 certainly, when undertaking their day-to-day lives on
the ground, there is not an expectation to be hit by something
from the sky. That said, very few things are one hundred per-
cent guaranteed safe, and risk has now become an accepted fac-
tor of our lives. Modes of transport have always had a high
element of risk, although it is recognized that “[a]irline services
involving the movement of scheduled passengers has become
one of the safest modes of transport.”57 However, this had not
always been the case, and it is far from consistent across the
globe.58
Although “risk” has been defined in various ways, an accepted
view is the probability of an occurrence concerning a hazardous
event (or events) during a given timeframe.59 The probability of
accidents and incidents involving drones is for the most part un-
known and unpredictable due to the fact that they are not oper-
ating en masse yet. However, the sheer fact that they will be in the
sky does present risks.
That said, there are other variable factors to take into ac-
count—use, location (built-up areas or other hazards, such as
physical features, whether mobile or static), the skills and loca-
tion of the operator, any material or cargo carried, the time of
day, and reliability and maintenance of the device, including the
55 Within the Spanish language, the word “seguridad” is used in terms of safety
and security. Seguridad, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S SPANISH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2003).
56 Sarah Fox, Safety and Security: The Influence of 9/11 to the EU Framework for Air
Carriers and Aircraft Operators, 45 RES. TRANS. ECON. 24, 26 (2014) [hereinafter
Fox, Safety and Security]; see also Fedja Netjasov & Milan Janic, A Review of Research
on Risk and Safety Modelling in Civil Aviation, 14 J. AIR TRANSPORT MGMT. 213,
213–20 (2008); Milan Janic, An Assessment of Risk and Safety in Civil Aviation, 6 J.
AIR TRANSPORT MGMT. 43, 43 (2000).
57 Fox, Safety and Security, supra note 57, at 24 (citing data from the FAA, the
NTSB, and the ICAO, among others. Data & Research: Safety, FED. AVIATION AD-
MIN., http://www.faa.gov/data_research/safety (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); NAT’L
TRANSP. SAFETY BD., http://www.ntsb.gov (last visited Oct. 24, 2017); INT’L CIV.
AVIATION ORG., http://www.icao.int/safety/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Oct.
24, 2017)); see also Safety Analysis, EUROPEAN AVIATION SAFETY AGENCY,
easa.europa.eu/safety-and-research/safety-analysis-and- research.php (last visited
Oct. 24, 2017); Clinton V. Oster Jr. et al., Analyzing Aviation Safety: Problems, Chal-
lenges, Opportunities, 43 RES. TRANS. ECON. 148, 163 (2013).
58 Sarah Jane Fox, Aviation: A Risky Business. Green and Level Playing Fields? A
Paradox of Virtues ‘Dumping’—Anti-Competitiveness!, 5 INT’L J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 333,
336–38 (2016) [hereinafter Fox, Aviation: A Risky Business].
59 Janic, supra note 57, at 43.
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ability to take collision-avoiding action, etc. As with civil aviation,
the human element will be one crucial aspect going forward—
the ability to conduct safe and orderly operations will be a criti-
cal factor in determining the rate of safety incidents and
accidents.
There is also the issues with the associated terminology: Will
they just operate or pilot the RPAS/UAVs in some circum-
stances, albeit, remotely from the ground? What level of training
will be required? Will this be related to the use or size of the
drone? Is the drone itself to be classified as a transportation ve-
hicle? Or will this again depend upon the use—commercial pur-
poses, which could cover the aspects of both transportation and
service (including for delivery), or leisure and hobby pursuits?
The 2014 EU Communications paper60 certainly recognized the
contribution drones will make within an integrated logistical
transport chain, but classification is also required in terms of
operational needs.
Arguably, drones could have more commonality with a road
transport system than the current aviation air travel system. Go-
ing forward, the automation of the autonomous road vehicular
system will also require the same thought and consideration as
to the licensing and operation of such vehicles and systems, in-
cluding in terms of accountability. And while there are undoubt-
edly lessons to be learned from the manned aviation sector, it is
also suggested that there are, and will be, similarities and lessons
to be learned from other transport modes, particularly road
transport (a point to be returned to later in this article).
There is no doubt that a framework should clearly identify all
of these aspects in order to recognize and minimize the poten-
tial for risks, such as accidents or incidents, and indeed, litiga-
tion. It will also need to cater for the interaction of RPAS with
manned aircraft, from both a safety and security perspective.61
In 2015, the Riga Declaration (on drones) also stated the
need and worth of a framework, identifying that the “basic regu-
latory framework should be put in place without delay, in order
to help the private sector to take well-informed investment deci-
sions, and to provide a basic set of rules for the many operators
who are increasingly eager to begin providing services.”62
60 A New Era for Aviation, supra note 22, at 2.
61 Note: The sharing of airspace remains outside of the scope of this article.
62 Riga Declaration on Remotely Piloted Aircraft (Drones): “Framing the Future Of Avi-
ation”, § 1 (Mar. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Riga Declaration].
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The Riga Declaration added that drones, “must not be less
safe than is accepted from civil aviation in general. . . . The way
safety is regulated must be proportional to the operational risk
involved.”63 Safety threats present themselves clearly to people
on the ground as well as those in the sky. The following are just
a few examples of such safety threats:
(1) April 2014: An Australian triathlete sustained minor head
injuries after a drone fell from the sky.64
(2) November 2015: An eighteen-month-old boy lost an eye
after being hit by a drone flown by a family friend.65
(3) March 2016: A drone came within approximately 200 feet
of a Lufthansa Airbus A380 approaching Los Angeles In-
ternational Airport.66
These incidents, together with a growing number of reports,
only too clearly shows the potential risk (and risk of disaster) to
manned aircraft. The number of close encounters between
drones and manned aircraft (regardless of whether deemed ac-
cidental safety events or security incidents) will no doubt in-
crease. Therefore, regardless of the size and use of the drone,
any framework must cater for such recognition.
From a security perspective, drones will pose a security threat
no matter the operator’s intentions.67 We are constantly seeing
all transport modes being targeted, and it should therefore be
accepted that this is a mode that will inevitably be utilized as a
weapon; indeed, military use has clearly shown this to be the
case. Criminals and terrorists could clearly utilize their own
UAVs or drones, which could carry explosives or other airborne
63 Id. at §2.
64 Australian Triathlete Injured After Drone Crash, BBC NEWS (Apr. 7, 2014), http:
//m.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-26921504 [https://perma.cc/W94L-BSS2].
65 Toddler’s Eyeball Sliced in Half by Drone Propeller, BBC NEWS (Nov. 26, 2015),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-hereford-worcester-34936739 [https://
perma.cc/3XRG-UTH2].
66 Joseph Serna, Lufthansa Jet and Drone Nearly Collide Near LAX, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 19, 2016, 8:57 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-drone-
near-miss-lax-20160318-story.html [https://perma.cc/LD58-WJTM].
67 For example, in 2015, a drone reportedly crashed into a prison wall while
attempting to deliver drugs, phones, and weapons. Jail Bird: Drone Crashes into
Prison Wall: Attempting to Deliver Drugs, Phone & Weapons, RT (Mar. 23, 2015, 3:16
PM), https://www.rt.com/uk/243245-drone-crash-prison-drugs/ [https://per
ma.cc/YZR5-PL9D].
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viruses, diseases, etc., and in essence, they could be used in (ter-
rorist) warfare, within a home country to attack targets on the
ground and flying low in the air.
There is also a cybersecurity threat, whereby terrorists and
other criminals can block the navigation or communication sys-
tem of someone else’s UAV, thus taking control of it (or simply
ending control of it). The Lloyd’s of London report highlighted
that the unencrypted data links for command, control, and navi-
gation that are used by most civilian drone owners make the
drones especially susceptible to jamming, interception, and ma-
nipulation. 68 It was further stated that research highlighted the
ease with which drones can be attacked in this manner, but at
this time, such vulnerability was not being factored in by insur-
ers’ assessment of drone risks, and hence, government develop-
ments.69 It was added that cybersecurity will be, and indeed must
be, an increasingly important consideration for commercial
drone operations.70
Such possibilities, while frightening, are both potential and
realistic, and are factors that an appropriate framework must
consider. Cyberthreats to manned systems are today’s challenge,
which will only increase alongside the threats posed by and to
drones.71 Safety and security for manned operation remains of
paramount importance within the strategic objectives of the
ICAO and the EU aviation policy, and going forward, it will be
necessary to see this translated and applied to the UAV market.
The protection of society must be the primary concern—above
the commercial worth of the new drone industry.
IV. THE EU
The Treaty of Rome (establishing the European Economic
Community) was not signed until March 25, 1957, and entered
into force on January 1, 1958.72 This means that the European
Community did not exist until virtually ten years after the estab-
lishment of the ICAO. Membership to what is now the EU has
grown to currently twenty-eight Member States, all of which are
members of the United Nations in their own right. The EU (as a
68 Drones Take Flight: Key Issues for Insurance, supra note 53, at 12.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Sarah Jane Fox, Flying Challenges for the Future: Aviation Preparedness – in the
Face of Cyber-Terrorism, 9 J. TRANSP. SEC. 191, 191–93 (2016) (portion delivered to
the United Nations in Geneva, May 2016).
72 Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 140.
698 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [82
body) only has observer status at the United Nations, and has
since 1974. Even then the position of the EU remains questiona-
ble, because it has not managed to obtain Community member-
ship of the ICAO as a single entity, given that Article 92 of the
Chicago Convention states that it is only open to States. Never-
theless, the EU has shown that, by taking a united approach, it
has been able to achieve significant success in terms of aviation,
particularly internally. In many ways, it has demonstrated to all
ICAO members and the aviation community at large what can
be achieved by a collective approach in a relatively short period
of time.
A. THE EU APPROACH
Until 1987, the civil aviation market in Europe was protected
and fragmented, with differing practices and standards across
the then-Member States, and in order to create a unitary mar-
ket, a succession of packages had to be introduced.73 The 2008
Regulation, (EC) 1008/2008,74 established common rules for
the operation of air services in the Community (the Air Service
Regulation).
Through a steady stream of legislative approaches, the EU
created a single aviation market that has encompassed virtually
the entire spectrum of civil aviation, including airports (ground
handling, slots, air traffic management, etc.), environmental is-
sues, competition rules (including state aid), personnel, social
issues, and passenger rights. However, the events of September
11, 2001, highlighted that more unity was still needed within the
EU regarding both safety and security measures.75 This led to
the EU taking swift action through revisions, regarding both
preventative measures and related legislation, which resulted in
the European Commission making a legislative proposal to
bring aviation security under the EU’s regulatory area of compe-
tence. This led to the adoption of a framework Regulation (Reg-
73 Fox, Safety and Security, supra note 57, at 28; see also Sarah Fox, Single European
Skies: Functional Airspace Blocks – Delays and Responses, 41 AIR & SPACE L. 201,
205–10 (2016).
74 Council Regulation (EC) No. 300/2008 of 11 March 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 97/
72) [hereinafter Reg. No. 300/2008]. This Regulation is on common rules in the
field of civil aviation security and repealing and replaced the Third Package.
75 Fox, Safety and Security, supra note 57, at 25.
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ulation EC 2320/2002)76 as well as sweeping revisions to the
insurance protection and compensation mechanism. Regulation
(EC) 785/200477 established minimum insurance requirements
for air carriers and aircraft operators regarding passengers, bag-
gage, cargo, and third parties, while also recognizing the need
to partly address the reduced insurance supply for the risks of
war and terrorism.78 In this regard, there are lessons to be
learned and applied to the use of civil drones and to recognize
the potential for drones to be equally capable of causing
devastation.
Later, the Treaty of Lisbon79 clearly defined that the transport
chapter (as within Articles 90 through 100 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU))80 remains a
shared competence with Member States81 (and reference is
made to the fact that the EU has competence regarding a frame-
work of a common transport policy, Article 90, as stated within
Title VI of TFEU).82 This clearly provides the mechanism, at an
EU level, for a framework to be developed that addresses the
related operational issues of the drones collectively among the
Member States.
That said, the current position regarding RPAS in the EU is,
arguably, where the civil aviation market was in the early 1980s
in terms of being fragmented, unregulated, or both.
V. APPLYING LESSONS LEARNED TO THE RPA AND
UNMANNED AVIATION (DRONE) SECTOR
There are various lessons to learn from the development of
the manned EU aviation sector—including the length of time
after the Rome Treaties for it to both get recognized and then
76 Council Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 of 16 December 2002, 2002 O.J. (L
355/1) (Establishing Common Rules in the Field of Civil Aviation Security)
[hereinafter Reg. No. 2320/2002].
77 Council Regulation (EC) No. 785/2004 of 21 April 2004, 2004 O.J. (L 138/
1) (on Insurance Requirements for Air Carriers and Aircraft Operators) [herein-
after Reg. No. 785/2004]. The Regulation was signed on April 21, 2004, but it did
not enter into force until April 30, 2005.
78 Fox, Safety and Security, supra note 57, at 30.
79 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) [herein-
after Treaty of Lisbon].
80 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 90-100, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 [hereinafter TFEU].
81 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 79, at 47; TFEU, supra note 80, art. 4.
82 Treaty of Lisbon, supra note 79, at 47.
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evolve into a framework.83 But applying some of the existing
provisions may not be the most logical approach with the drone
sector, and so it is necessary to recognize successes while adapt-
ing these to the different and newer challenges that UAVs bring.
Key aspects to factor in relate to safety and security provisions
(which remain the main focus of this paper). While safety stan-
dards need to be in place, it is recognized that accidents and
incidents will occur, so there is a need to ensure that compensa-
tion is available to victims (particularly regarding third-party lia-
bility and insurance).84 This must remain a priority of any
framework.
A. SAFETY AND INSURANCE
1. Regulation (EC )785/2004 and the Evolving Role of the
European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA)
The scope of Regulation (EC) 785/2004 is detailed within Ar-
ticle 2 encompassing “all air carriers and to all aircraft operators
flying within, into, out of, or over the territory of a Member
State to which the Treaty applies.”85 In this regard, it seems un-
likely the Regulation initially intended to cover commercial or
non-commercial drones, regardless of size.
Clarity is provided in Article 2(2), however, where specific ex-
clusions exist regarding insurance requirements:
(a) State aircraft as referred to in Article 3(b) of the Convention
on International Civil Aviation, signed at Chicago on 7 De-
cember 1944;
(b) model aircraft with an MTOM of less than 20 kg;
(c) foot-launched flying machines (including powered parag-
liders and hang gliders);
(d) captive balloons;
(e) kites;
(f) parachutes (including parascending parachutes);
(g) aircraft, including gliders, with a MTOM of less than 500 kg,
and microlights, which:
- are used for non-commercial purposes, or
- are used for local flight instruction which does not entail
the crossing of international borders.86
83 Fox, Safety and Security, supra note 57, at 28–29.
84 See Fox, International Aviation Liability, supra note 55, at 162, 164; Fox, Safety
and Security, supra note 57, at 24–33.
85 Reg. No. 785/2004, supra note 77, at 3.
86 Id.
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Article 3 provides further assistance, in particular defining:
(a) ‘air carrier’ means an air transport undertaking with a valid
operating licence;
(b) ‘Community air carrier’ means an air carrier with a valid op-
erating licence granted by a Member State in accordance
with Regulation (EEC) No 2407/92;
(c) ‘aircraft operator’ means the person or entity, not being an
air carrier, who has continual effective disposal of the use or
operation of the aircraft; the natural or legal person in
whose name the aircraft is registered shall be presumed to be
the operator, unless that person can prove that another per-
son is the operator;
(d) ‘flight’ means: . . .
- with regard to third parties, the use of an aircraft from the
moment when power is applied to its engines for the pur-
pose of taxiing or actual take-off until the moment when it
is on the surface and its engines have come to a complete
stop; additionally, it shall mean the moving of an aircraft
by towing and push-back vehicles or by powers which are
typical for the drive and the lift of aircraft, particularly air
streams; . . .
(h) ‘third party’ means any legal or natural person, excluding
passengers and on-duty members of both the flight crew and
the cabin crew;
(i) ‘commercial operation’ means an operation for remunera-
tion and/or hire.87
The coverage of Regulation (EC) 785/2004 includes air carriers
and aircraft operators obligations regarding passengers, bag-
gage, cargo, and third parties. A review by the European Com-
mission of the effectiveness and application of the Regulation
stated that it “imposes minimum insurance obligations on air
carriers and non-commercial aircraft operators in respect of liabil-
ity for passengers, baggage, cargo and third parties.”88
Applied to the operation of drones (carrying zero passen-
gers), these provisions are only relevant to any cargo carried and
to third parties. However, it has been questioned as to whether
third-party liability legislation is equally applicable to unmanned
aircraft as it is to manned aircraft.89 And while there may be a
87 Id. at 3–4.
88 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council, Insurance Requirements for Aircraft Operators in the EU – A Report on the
Operation of Regulation 785/2004, at 2, COM(2008) 216 final (Apr. 24, 2008) (em-
phasis added).
89 As also identified within Eur. Comm’n Memo 14/259, supra note 13, at 4.
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difference of opinion, it has been interpreted that Regulation
785/2004 describes the insurance obligations for all aircraft op-
erators, which necessitates equally that all “commercial” RPAS
operations purchase third-party liability insurance.90 Nonethe-
less, it has also been identified that there is no uniformity in
Europe regarding the application of third-party liability to avia-
tion.91 While some Member States follow a strict liability regime
(where the aviation company is automatically liable for any dam-
age without the need to attribute fault or blame), other Member
States carry out a fault-based analysis on a case-by-case basis.92
Therefore, it is likely that a similar, misaligned approach will
also be carried through to the RPAS market.93 Additionally,
while the Regulation specifies limits for the minimum amount
of third-party liability insurance required (based on the mass of
the aircraft on take-off as specified in the certificate of airworthi-
ness),94 the distinction between commercial, model, and leisure
users, upon which the rules in EU Regulation 785/2004 on lia-
bility are based, is far from defined. Arguably, the interpretation
remains limited by the lack of guidance and the rapid develop-
ments of the RPAS market, which has necessitated a common-
sense approach to ensure that some degree of responsibility and
liability is in place for their operations.
Likewise, the role of the EASA is currently limited regarding
RPAS. The primary function of EASA is to ensure safety within
the EU—this being cited as the main reason why it was estab-
lished in 2003.95 Regulations (EC) No 216/2008 (also called the
EASA Basic Regulation) and (EC) No 1108/2009, amending the
90 Explanatory Note: Prototype Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Opera-
tions, EASA 1, 53–54 (Aug. 22, 2016) [hereinafter EASA Explanatory Note], https:/
/www.easa.europa.eu/system/files/dfu/Explanatory%20Note%20for%20the%
20UAS%20Prototype%20regulation%20final.pdf; see EUROPEAN UNION COMMIT-
TEE, CIVILIAN USE OF DRONES IN THE EU, 2014–15, HL 122, at 53 (UK).
91 Steer Davies Gleave, Study on the Third-Party Liability and Insurance Require-
ments of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS): Final Report, at 1 (2014), http://ec.
europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/7661 [https://perma.cc/EZ2J-V4SX].
92 Id.
93 Id. at 15; see also Fox, Safety and Security, supra note 57.
94 Reg. No. 785/2004, supra note 77, at 4–5. For example, for RPAS weighing
less than 500kg, the minimum cover required is 750,000 SDR (0.75 million Spe-
cial Drawing Rights), which is approximately _660,000.
95 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1592/2002 of 15 July 2002, art. 2, 2002 O.J. (L
240/1) [hereinafter Reg. No. 1592/2002]. On July 15, 2002, the European Parlia-
ment and the Council of the European Union adopted Regulation (EC) No.
1592/2002 establishing common rules for the EU in the field of civil aviation and
creating a new European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).
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former, have seen the current scope of EASA’s development
and expansion over the period of time since its formulation.96
Presently, there is a further proposal to revise the remit of the
Agency once again.97 The reasons identified for these revisions,
as within the proposal, are not only aviation safety but also the
European Commission priorities of cultivating jobs leading to
growth, “developing the internal market and strengthening Eu-
rope’s role as a global actor.”98 This initiative’s aims are there-
fore linked to the commercial competitiveness of the European
aviation industry, including aeronautical manufacturing and
technological innovation.99 One key issue shown is the need to
“create an effective regulatory framework for the integration of
new business models and emerging technologies.”100 It is fer-
vently identified that this initiative aims at the creation of a Eu-
ropean Union framework for safe integration of unmanned
aircraft within the European airspace.101 This naturally links into
the overarching and revised European Aviation Strategy, within
which there is a stated need to revise Regulation (EC) No 216/
2008, specifically citing the introduction of provisions on
drones.102
In addition to safety, it is identified within the EASA proposal
that drone “operators should be in a position to use the same
unmanned aircraft and the same operating requirements with
the same pilot at different places in the Union to develop their
businesses.” 103 Therefore, the need remains for consistency and
common rules within the EU internal market, which, after all,
has always been the primary reason for the developing Commu-
96 Council Regulation (EC) No. 216/2008 of 20 February 2008, 2008 O.J. (L
79/1) [hereinafter Reg. No. 216/2008]; Council Regulation (EC) No. 1108/2009
of 21 October 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 309/51) [hereinafter Reg. No. 1108/2009].
97 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Common
Rules in the Field of Civil Aviation and Establishing a European Union Aviation Safety
Agency, and Repealing Regulation (EC) No 216/2008 of the European Parliament and of
the Council, COM(2015) 613 final (Dec. 7, 2015) [hereinafter COM(2015) 613
final].




102 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, An Aviation Strategy for Europe, at 13, COM(2015) 598 final (Dec. 7,
2015).
103 COM(2015) 613 final, supra note 97, at 4.
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nities.104 However, subsidiarity is also identified as a key consid-
eration, whereby “Member State authorities will carry out local
risk assessments and decide which airspace shall be open or
closed to unmanned aircraft operations, and under which con-
ditions.”105 It is therefore recognized that most light unmanned
aircraft operations will retain a local element, meaning the local
authorities should assess the level of risk.106
In parallel to the proposal to see the role of EASA amended, a
“Prototype” Commission Regulation on Unmanned Aircraft Op-
erations has also been published.107 It reiterates that while Regu-
lation (EC) 785/2004 excludes “model aircraft” below 20
kilograms for the minimum insurance requirements, it does re-
main “applicable to an unmanned aircraft not qualifying as
‘model aircraft.’”108 That said, the explanatory note clearly iden-
tifies that insurance falls outside the scope of the EASA remit,
although the proposal makes reference to a product legislation
framework (and linked product liability) alongside a risk-impact
mechanism relating to the impact by a UAV on the ground.109 In
this manner, a risk-centric approach is utilized to define the re-
lationship between the kind or category of UA and the possible
injury suffered by an “unprotected human hit by the UA.”110
This is an interesting statement to include, not least because it
implies the need to conversely be protected from UAVs by some
means. That said, determining risk is based on variable methods
of “operation centric, proportionate, risk- and performance-
based regulatory framework[s].”111 To this aim, an injury scale is
proposed and various weights are cited within the Prototype
Regulation, which is also used to determine categories and inju-
ries.112 Risk can also be variable depending upon whether there
is a line-of-sight operation or more remote control.113 As it cur-




107 EASA Explanatory Note, supra note 90.
108 Id. at 6.
109 Id. at 11.
110 Id.
111 Id. at 14; see also Civil Drones (Unmanned Aircraft), EASA, https://
www.easa.europa.eu/easa-and-you/civil-drones-rpas (last visited Oct. 24, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/EP62-TSHN].
112 EASA Explanatory Note, supra note 90, at 15.
113 Id. at 10.
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programed and unpiloted (even remotely), are still unautho-
rized for use by either ICAO or EU rules.114
The aspects of weight and liability will no doubt continue to
linger on for RPAs, much in the same way they have for manned
aircraft. This becomes even more relevant since it is predicted
that small drones weighing less than fifty-five pounds (twenty-
five kilograms)—including payloads—and which can be con-
trolled remotely, will particularly experience growth over the
coming years. Presently, the EU does not regulate the civilian
use of an RPA with a mass of 150 kilograms or less.115 This is
because Regulation 216/2008 currently covers only aircraft
whose mass is above that size.116 The proposal to repeal and re-
place the current Regulation would significantly change this. In
the meantime, RPAs with a mass of 150 kilograms or less remain
subject to national rules adopted by the EU Member States. In
other words, EASA would see an increase of its purview to in-
clude RPAS with a mass below 150 kilograms.
2. Rome Convention: Comparison with Regulation (EC) 785/2004
Similar to Regulation 785/2004, the Rome Convention states
that liability for third party damage belongs to the operator of
the aircraft, and does not require proof of the operator’s intent
or negligence.117 Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention, “Any
person who suffers damage on the surface shall, upon proof
only that the damage was caused by an aircraft in flight . . . be
entitled to compensation.”118 Once again, the definition of “air-
craft” is missing, but from an international perspective, it is has
been argued that the 1952 Rome Convention equally applies to
drones. However, it must be recognized that it was written long
before today’s usage of drones was anticipated. And it has fur-
ther limitations in terms of coverage, specifically that the scope
of the Rome Convention is essentially limited to certain interna-
tional flights because it governs only ground damage “caused in
the territory of a Contracting State by an aircraft registered in
the territory of another Contracting State.”119 This means that
when damage is caused by an aircraft registered in the State
114 Eur. Comm’n Memo 14/259, supra note 13, at 1.
115 Reg. No. 216/2008, supra note 96, at Annex II.
116 Id.
117 Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the
Surface art. 2, 6, Oct. 7, 1952, 310 U.N.T.S. 181 [hereinafter Rome Convention].
118 Id. art. 1.
119 Id. art. 23.
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where the damage occurred, national law applies (and for the
EU, regional direction is provided by Regulation 785/2004).
Later, the 1978 Montreal Protocol120 widened the liability limits
from the Rome Convention by adding when the damage is:
“caused in the territory of a Contracting State . . . by an aircraft,
whatever its registration may be, the operator of which has his
principal place of business or, if he has no such place of busi-
ness, his permanent residence in another Contracting State.”121
Similar to the EU Regulation, the Rome Convention also pro-
vides categories for third party liability as determined by the
stated “maximum take off weight” (MTOW).122 However, there
is a noticeably different banding system applied within the lat-
ter. In any event, as is a clear disadvantage with international
conventions, the Rome Convention has not achieved wide-
spread acceptance. With only forty-nine ratifications, the Con-
vention is applicable in relatively few countries.123 The 1978
Montreal Protocol achieved even less acceptance, having been
ratified by only twelve countries, none of which are European
countries. Therefore, within Europe, the Montreal Convention
is normally irrelevant for third-party liability claims against the
drone’s operator.124
3. “Insuring” Protection
From an international perspective, there are key issues to rec-
ognize here. First, there have always been difficulties in translat-
ing the good intentions of international cooperation and
adherence to a common goal. The compromises in the Chicago
Convention in 1944 clearly show this to be the case.125 And in
more recent times, the attempt by ICAO to aid the facilitation of
an international third-party insurance “mutual fund” as an alter-
120 Protocol to Amend the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft
to Third Parties on the Surface, Sept. 23, 1978, 2195 U.N.T.S. 372 [hereinafter
1978 Montreal Protocol].
121 Id. art. XII.
122 Rome Convention, supra note 117, art. 11.
123 List of Parties: Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties
on the Surface, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal/List%20of%20Par
ties/Rome1952_EN.pdf#search=Rome%201952 [https://perma.cc/VVF5-EJCC].
124 List of Parties: Protocol to Amend the Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign
Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface, ICAO, https://www.icao.int/secretariat/legal
/List%20of%20Parties/Mtlpr78_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F9N-2EJ8].
125 Sarah Jane Fox, “CONTEST”ing Chicago: Origins and Reflections: Lest We For-
get!, 8 INT’L J. PRIV. L. 73 (2015); Fox, Aviation: A Risky Business, supra note 59, at
342–44.
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native to commercial insurance for airlines failed to receive the
substantial support it needed to drive this initiative forward.126
While the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, may have pro-
vided the impetus for revisiting the compensation mechanisms
and schemes serving the aviation industry, the truth is that the
later 2009 Convention on Compensation for Damage Caused by
Aircraft to Third Parties127 and the 2009 Convention on Com-
pensation for Damage to Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of
Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft128 also failed to receive
buy-in from the international community.129 So while the attacks
provided the impetus for these progressive thoughts (namely of
ensuring that suitable compensation schemes were put into
place for such future eventualities), the reality is that it did not
invariably lead to their achievement—even if, as Michael Milde
states, these were largely misdirected in the first place.130 That
said, the EU Regulation showed that advancement could be
made in terms of today’s challenges (such as terrorism)—partic-
ularly by way of a comparison with an arguably outdated Con-
vention—and one that is limited in terms of international
recognition and agreement.
Second, while it is recognized that there is a need to ensure
that mechanisms are in place to cover liability (particularly for
third parties), there is an equal need to ensure that such
schemes are fit for purpose and cover all eventualities. It has
long been argued that applying MTOW to liability fails to appre-
ciate the risks of anything airborne (such as a drone) being used
as a weapon itself. From this perspective, Milde states that the
MTOW is a disproportionate benchmark. 131 It is furthermore
contended that a light aircraft, or equally a drone, may cause
untold damage in sensitive areas, such as a nuclear plant or an
oil refinery, disproportionate to its weight.132 The “use” and
“purpose” of the drone, linked to an associated risk, is also a
contentious matter, and as identified previously, the line and
126 Fox, International Aviation Liability, supra note 55, at 174.
127 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Convention on Compensation for Damage
Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties, ICAO Doc. 9919 (May 2, 2009).
128 Int’l Civil Aviation Org. [ICAO], Convention on Compensation for Damage
to Third Parties, Resulting from Acts of Unlawful Interference Involving Aircraft,
ICAO Doc. 9920 (May 2, 2009).
129 Fox, International Aviation Liability, supra note 55, at 162–82.
130 MICHAEL MILDE, ESSENTIAL AIR AND SPACE LAW 309 (Marietta Benko¨ ed., 2d
ed. 2012).
131 Id. at 303.
132 Fox, International Aviation Liability, supra note 55, at 162–82.
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distinction between users is becoming further blurred in many
cases. Moreover, it has been identified that a drone, whether
used for commercial or recreational purposes, can cause the
same damage and destruction to property or persons on the
ground—“the risk to the public is really no different if this 10kg
vehicle is being flown in the park by a child or used for survey
purposes.”133 Going forward, there may also be a need to ensure
more consistency in terms of applying strict liability, as opposed
to considering a case-by-case approach when damage or injury
has been caused, or even life lost.
There is no doubt that these factors will continue to be de-
bated, but a logical consensus of agreement must be reached. It
would be a common sense approach to take EU Regulation
785/2004 as a starting point—but whether or not this is used as
a baseline in Europe or internationally remains to be seen. How-
ever, this Regulation coming at the time when it did (stemming
from the events of September 11) demands that serious thought
be given to ensuring that protection is available equally, particu-
larly to persons (and property on the ground), including when
the operators of a UAV cannot be traced. Unfortunately, the
present times have shown that terrorism-related claims will be
increasing, but across the globe there are differences as to the
aid, assistance, and financial support available to victims.134 All
transport modes continue to be targeted by extremists, but be-
side security and terrorist threats, safety incidents will warrant
the same concerns.
While Regulation 785/2004 and the Rome Convention state
that the aircraft operator is responsible, it is surely an easier task
133 CIVILIAN USE OF DRONES IN THE EU, supra note 90, at 53–54.
134 See Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur), Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Symposium: The
Rights of Victims of Terrorism (Apr. 2, 2012). For example, within the United
Kingdom (UK), following the events of terrorist attacks perpetrated on British
soil (e.g., the UK July 7 attacks where transport systems were targeted), victims
were able to apply through the UK Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority, a
government body that runs a compensation scheme for the victims of violent
crime in England, Scotland, or Wales. Government Support: United Kingdom, U.N.:
VICTIMS OF TERRORISM SUPPORT PORTAL, https://www.un.org/victimsofterrorism/
en/node/613 (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) [https://perma.cc/LZ4C-W8HF]. How-
ever, that said, the same support has not been available in the same manner to
British subjects that have suffered at the hand of terrorists abroad. Recognizing
this, the UK has made some amendments to their systems of entitlement since
2012. Compensation for Victims of Terrorist Attacks Abroad, GOV.UK, https://
www.gov.uk/compensation-victim-terrorist-attack (last visited Oct. 24, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/EUW5-NYQN].
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to regulate and police the current civilian manned aviation mar-
ket—whether it is the commercial or general aviation arena—
than the operator of a drone (particularly a drone that is used
for leisure or hobby purposes). The Riga Declaration states that
“[w]hen a drone service is delivered in prohibited airspace, in
an unsafe manner, or for illegal purposes, the authorities should
be able to act and hold the operator accountable.”135 However,
while this may be a desired intention, in practice it will not be an
easy task to accomplish. From a European perspective, it is indi-
cated that this will shift back onto the national governance sys-
tem. This seems not only an ineffective method, but also one
that does not sit within the objectives of creating an internal
market for the users of the drones to operate in. One suggestion
advocated within the Riga Declaration is that identity chips
should be fitted on drones (IDrones),136 but this in itself does
not seem a well-thought-through proposal in terms of acknowl-
edging the potential for misuse and abuse by the criminal and
terrorist markets. From the insurance perspective, consideration
must be given to having a national, European, or international
system in place (in a similar way as advocated by ICAO, by way of
a mutual fund) to cover disasters where no individual or opera-
tor can be held accountable. The Chicago Convention states,
“Each contracting State undertakes to insure that the flight of
such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall
be so controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.”137 Argued
literally, this implies an obligation for anything operating in the
skies not just toward other civil aircraft, but also to persons on
the ground.
Undoubtedly, there is more risk of operations being carried
out by untraceable drone users than current manned aircraft
users due to the very nature and usage methods of drones,
which do not require the same supporting infrastructure as a
manned aircraft (in terms of an airport, runway, or airfield)
and, therefore, also do not require a recorded itinerary or path.
This makes monitoring operations, ensuring compliancy, and
ultimately, policing and enforcing much more complicated fac-
tors that have not yet been taken fully into account. These fac-
tors (and related considerations and concerns) bear more
relation and synergy to road transport operations and vehicular
135 Riga Declaration, supra note 63, § 5.
136 Id.
137 Chicago Convention, supra note 17, art. 8 (emphasis added).
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use than to current civilian aircraft movements and services. So,
in developing a suitable framework, there are invariably lessons
to be learned from other transport modes in addition to civil air
transport.
B. MONITORING, POLICING, INVESTIGATING, AND PROSECUTING
Currently, for civil aviation within Europe, there is a layered
system of governance and accountability, with ICAO retaining
an international role (to which Member States independently
remain signatories to the Chicago Convention). The role of the
European Commission for Mobility and Transport remains to
“promote a mobility that is efficient, safe, secure and environ-
mentally friendly and to create the conditions for a competitive
industry generating growth and jobs” within the EU.138 Related
agencies, such as EASA, exist to facilitate certain aspects within
this remit. So while the EU has established legislation and rules
(e.g., common rule in relation to the field of aviation secur-
ity),139 the Directorate-General also works with the Member
States to translate the related aims and associated objectives.
1. Aviation Security and Application to Drones
Regulation (EC) 300/2008 lays down common rules and basic
standards on aviation security, as well as procedures to monitor
its implementation.140 The standards apply to:
• Screening of passengers, cabin baggage, and hold
baggage;
• Airport security including access and surveillance;
• Aircraft security checks and searches;
• Screening of mail and cargo;
• Screening of airport supplies; and
• Staff recruitment and training.141
It is difficult to see how any of these areas will apply to com-
mercial drone operations (or otherwise). It is therefore likely
that a commercially-licensed operator will have to be accounta-
138 About Us, EUR. COMM’N: MOBILITY & TRANSPORT, https://ec.europa.eu/
transport/about-us_it (last updated Oct. 24, 2017) [https://perma.cc/W977-
YBDG].
139 Reg. No. 300/2008, supra note 74. No. 2320/2002 was the initial framework
Regulation, while Regulation 300/2008 has been supplemented several times to
take account of new threats and challenges.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 76.
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ble for both the security operations and the flight of the drone
much in the same way that occurs within the road haulage, rail
movement, or transport services that are provided within the
Member State of operations (i.e., are not cross-border
operations).
Delegated responsibilities include designating a single compe-
tent authority for aviation security within each Member State
and setting up a national civil aviation security program and a
national quality control program.142 Again, it would be difficult
to see how this would translate to drone operations because
drones do not take off from existing designated airbases (air-
ports or airfields) in the same way that commercial flights and
services currently do—a primary difference.
While security will remain a key issue of drone operations
and, although this was stressed by the EU Commission,143 very
few suggestions for mitigating the risks as identified by Lloyd’s
of London144 have been suggested. Security remains a major
consideration in the EU Air Transport Management Master Plan
(of which RPAS “will become an integral part”),145 but it “will
then need to be translated into legal obligations for all relevant
players, such as the air navigation service provider.”146 In other
words, security will be a delegated task likely to be assigned back
to a State level. The intention linked to this is “Action 3: The
Commission will ensure that security aspects are covered in the
operations of RPAS to avoid unlawful interference, so that man-
ufacturers and operators can take the appropriate security miti-
gating measures.”147
This, therefore, implies a “compliancy and product liability”
responsibility partly assigned to a manufacturer. But unless sales
are to be confined to EU sources, it is difficult to see how this
would equally work among all makers of drones (for example,
those outside the EU), unless a duty was also placed on import-
ers. The statement also reinforces the previous statement in
terms of “[t]he operator of a drone” being “responsible for its
use”148—pointing potentially to a direct “strict” liability standard
for all factors linked to use (arguably extending into the remit
142 Id. at 73.
143 A New Era for Aviation, supra note 22.
144 Drones Take Flight: Key Issues for Insurance, supra note 53.
145 COM(2014) 207 final, supra note 22, at 7.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Riga Declaration, supra note 63, § 5.
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of ensuring compliancy by a manufacturer for adherence to se-
curity standards). However, the Riga Declaration, coming a year
after the Communication document of the Commission, while
equally recognizing the security risks, adds that “malicious use of
drones cannot be entirely prevented by design or operational
restrictions.”149 It then goes on to advocate that “[i]t is the task
of the national police and justice systems to address those
risks.”150 Without a clear framework in place, it is difficult to see
how the police service will be equipped to actually undertake
this assigned role. Unlike a motor vehicle, drones will not have
vehicle identification marks visible when flying, so consideration
will need to be given now (and in any framework) to any associ-
ated security risk of a drone in flight and the means and mecha-
nism to stop it (and bring it down without further risk to
persons on the ground).
In essence, a suitable governance framework will need to con-
sider factors linked to both security and safety, such as (1) regis-
tration and identification of the drone (so as to determine age,
location, description, specifications, where it is permanently
housed, etc.), and therefore, the registration of the drone by the
owner; (2) the registration and licensing of the drone operator
(potentially commercial and non-commercial operations); (3)
whether the device needs to be tested (potentially depending
upon its role, use, weight, and location) for airworthiness
(drone safety management); (4) location and time of use, etc.;
and (5) the requirements for the “operator,” viewed from the
sense of the controller while in flight—i.e., the pilot or flyer
role—and the respective license requirements (potentially de-
pending upon the role, location, items carried, risk, etc.).
However, the real skill be monitoring and enforcing these re-
quirements. The above shows that this role will lie not only with
the national civil aviation authority, but also with the police of
Member States. Of course, this leads to an obvious question re-
garding accident and incident investigations during use: Will
someone unfortunate enough to sustain damage to their prop-
erty or incur personal injury have to resort to a civil claim for
compensation? Or will this role be undertaken by the national
civil aviation authority (or even delegated on to the police)?
Currently, in conjunction with the Annexes to the Chicago Con-
vention, the EU has Regulation 996/2020, which concerns the
149 Id. § 4.
150 Id.
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investigation and prevention of accidents and incidents in civil
aviation.151 This Regulation reinforces that, in accordance with
Annex 13, the “investigation of accidents and serious incidents
is to be conducted under the responsibility of the State where
the accident or serious incident occurs, or the State of Registry
when the location . . . cannot definitely be established as being
in the territory of any State.”152
The applicability of this Regulation is stated in Article 2,
which explains that it concerns “the operation of an aircraft,”153
and here again, no clear definition of aircraft is provided. While
it is implied that it is applicable to manned (and unmanned)
operations, this is not clearly specified. However, it is stated that
the investigations apply to aircraft registered in a Member State
or operated by an undertaking established in a Member State,
which includes aircraft with a maximum take-off mass less than
or equal to 2250 kilograms.154 At the current time, drone inci-
dents and accidents have been investigated under this Regula-
tion and related national legislation within the EU, but this has
been the case when matters have also concerned manned air-
craft (or have been in the vicinity of an airport). However, going
forward it will be interesting to see how this Regulation, Annex
13, and other related Annexes to the Chicago Convention are
applied to the use of drones.
As of May 5, 2017, EASA published a proposal to regulate the
operation of small drones in Europe.155 All interested parties
had until mid-August 2017 to respond.156 The intention of the
Notice of Proposed Amendment (NPA) is to recommend creat-
151 Council Regulation (EU) No. 996/2010, of 20 October 2010, 2010 O.J. (L
295/35).
152 Id. at 35. There is also a proviso that this may be delegated or that the
assistance of another State may be requested.
153 Id. at 38.
154 Id. at 41.
155 NPA 2017-05: Introduction of a Regulatory Framework for the Operation of
Drones—Unmanned Aircraft System Operations in the Open and Specific Category, EASA
(May 4, 2017) [hereinafter Regulatory Framework for Drones], https://www.easa.eur
opa.eu/document-library/notices-of-proposed-amendment/npa-2017-05 [https:/
/perma.cc/L4GX-M5KZ]. Published in a document called a Notice of Proposed
Amendment (NPA), the proposal has been developed with the support of a large
group of experts: representatives of the EASA Member States, the UAS industry,
UAS operators, aviation representatives, and aero modeling associations.
156 Id. The consultation period was since extended until September 15, 2017.
For a full summary, see EASA NPA 2017-05 – European UAS Regulatory Framework:
Outline, CIV. AVIATION AUTH. (June 2017), https://publicapps.caa.co.uk/docs/33
/CAP%201559%20EASA%20NPA%202017-05%20outline_V2.pdf.
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ing a new regulation (Regulation (EU) 201X/XXX’) that
defines:
[T]he measures to mitigate the risk of operations in: [(1)] the
open category through a combination of limitations, operational
rules, requirements for the competence of the remote pilot, as
well as technical requirements for the UAS; and [(2)] the spe-
cific category through a system including a risk assessment con-
ducted by the operator before starting an operation, or the
operator complying with a standard scenario, or the operator
holding a certificate with privileges.157
The final Opinion will be submitted by EASA to the European
Commission at the end of 2017. Going forward, it will be inter-
esting to watch the proposal develop and see the various views of
stakeholders being crafted into a final Regulation. Of course, it
will be significant to see the EU’s interpretation on many of the
points and issues discussed within this article. In June 2017, EU
Commissioner for Transport Violeta Bulc acknowledged:
Drones mean innovation, new services for citizens, new business
models and a huge potential for economic growth. We need the
EU to be in the driving seat and have a safe drone services mar-
ket up and running by 2019. The EU needs to take a leading role
worldwide in developing the right framework for this market to
flourish, by unleashing the benefits for key economic sectors.158
VI. CONCLUSION
While Member States of the EU have continued to apply the
Chicago Convention and the related Annexes, subsequent inter-
national treaties have not always been met with equal enthusi-
asm and commitment—no doubt due to a legacy of wanting to
retain sovereign control in the skies above a Member State’s
own airspace. But that said, the EU, once having a fragmented
and disjointed civil aviation system amongst the State members,
has successfully managed to remove decades of internal restric-
tions, which allowed for the creation of an open market. Subse-
quently, this had been extended through to a successful
external aviation policy. In doing this, the EU States have
achieved a joint agreement across safety and security provisions
157 Regulatory Framework for Drones, supra note 155, at 1.
158 Aviation: Commission is Taking the European Drone Sector to New Heights, EUR.
COMM’N (June 16, 2017) https://ec.europa.eu/transport/modes/air/news/
2017-06-16-aviation-commission-taking-european-drone-sector-new-heights_en
[https://perma.cc/UE3Y-APBV].
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allowing them to face new challenges with arguably more suc-
cess than the wider international aviation community. Septem-
ber 11 tested all civil aviation markets and providers, but the EU
stood together and its competence was recognized as more ef-
fective at a supranational level in relation to security across the
Union (albeit Member States were able to apply security provi-
sions above the minimum level agreed). Yet, with the rise of
drones on the horizon and the commercial potential just being
realized, even the EU, alongside the wider international com-
munity, has recognized that it is not prepared and does not have
a suitable framework in place to meet existing challenges and
potential opportunities of this new unmanned flight era.
As the ICAO acknowledged, there must be a better collective
way of approaching such developments and technological ad-
vancements, while realizing and learning from the mistakes of
not being prepared and not working together cooperatively.
The community does not have the luxury of twenty-five years to
develop a new framework for the advancing drone and un-
manned aviation systems now upon society. The statement at the
beginning of the article,159 made some seventy-one years ago,
realized, or even arguably prophesized, where development of
transport systems in the skies would take us. The world watched
as this developed through the military usage of drones in com-
bat and reconnaissance situations. However, while showing the
power of unity and cooperation, the EU now finds itself in the
same situation it was in during the 1980s regarding manned civil
aviation. Member States are now developing their own ap-
proaches and frameworks to drones which can surely not be to
any one Member State’s advantage. In the EU, the stage appears
set on the drone front for legislative movements by the end of
2020. The question remains: is this soon enough? There re-
mains undoubtedly more risk to society, in terms of safety and
security, by not having a common governance system in place
that will meet the operational potential and the dangers of the
drone!
159 Grumman Hatches a Mallard, supra note 1.
